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Labor Flexibilization after the Foreign Exchange 
Crisis and Changing Corporate Welfare in Korea*
Lee, Su Yun** and Rho, Yeon Hee***
The purpose of this study was to empirically test whether corporate welfare in Korea has 
grown since the mid 1990’s. The result of this study shows that after the IMF fiscal crisis, 
the labor flexibilization policies within labor markets initiated flexible forms of employer-
provided benefits. These benefits included cafeteria plan or profit-based funds, which 
ultimately led to a decline of corporate welfare rather than growth. Existing studies do not 
agree on a trade-off of statutory and voluntary social provisions since the crisis of welfare 
state. 
 Existing studies show that some nations experienced a decline of corporate welfare that 
coincided with a growth of state welfare, while other nations experienced a decline of state 
welfare coincident with a growth of corporate welfare. 
 Usng the case of Korea, this study suggests an archetypal development of a welfare system 
that experienced a decline of corporate welfare alongside a growth of state welfare provisions.
Keywords: Corporate Welfare, Labor Flexibilization, IMF Fiscal Crisis, Korea
I. IntroductIon
unlike Western countries, Korea has a much more developed corporate 
welfare system than a state welfare system. The significant difference in the 
development between state welfare and corporate welfare has been cited as 
one of the characteristics of Korea’s social welfare (Song, H. 1992; choi, G. 
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1992a; 1992b; Lee, J. 1999). There is also the possibility that corporate welfare 
will continue to grow (choi, G. 1992a; 1992b). choi, G. (1992a) argues that 
one of the reasons why corporate welfare has developed more than state 
welfare is that the state relegated the survival of workers and their families to 
the responsibility of the market (i.e. corporations).
In order to control the working class as they became post-politicalized and 
demobilized. He argues that if state welfare is limited in its growth, corporate 
welfare will continue to expand. In addition, some view it as desirable to 
establish a Korean social welfare model centering on corporate welfare as the 
state welfare’s development will be limited (Lee, G. 1986).
others have argued that corporate welfare in Korea will experience 
contraction rather than expansion (Song, H. 1992). Song, H. (1992) reasons 
that in Korea, the state has intervened in economic activity in various forms 
including wage control and resource allocation. corporations have benefited 
greatly from it these interventions, contributing to the expansion of corporate 
welfare because corporations felt obligated to pay back for these benefits. He 
argues however that if corporations’ competitiveness falls to a risky level, the 
national economy falls into a recession, or corporations have little to gain 
from government-backed economic liberalization, that sense of obligation 
would shrink dramatically.
Will corporate welfare in Korea continue to grow as it has and serve as 
one of the most important cornerstones of Korea’s social welfare? or will it 
stop growing and take another form in line with changes in the economic 
system? Indeed in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis, many corporations in 
Korea have started shifting away from a seniority based wage system to the 
annual salary system in an attempt to make the labor market more flexible. 
As part of this wave, there has been movement towards reducing the non-
wage labor cost of the corporate welfare system. Within this system, the 
amount of the employee welfare fund that is linked to performance has been 
gradually increasing. In addition, the adoption of cafeteria plans, where the 
corporation’s performance is linked to its corporate welfare costs to increase 
flexibility have also risen. this suggests that corporate welfare in Korea 
is changing from an institution of fixed-cost which is given in exchange 
for employment to one that is flexible and market-friendly and is greatly 
dependent on corporate management.
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this study analyzes how the labor flexibilization strategy in the wake of 
the foreign exchange crisis has changed corporate welfare in Korea. I use the 
Esping-Andersen’s argument, which attributes changes in corporate welfare 
to labor flexibilization, resulting from a production paradigm towards post-
Fordism. Esping-Andersen (1996) argues that a shift to post-Fordism caused 
stagnant growth in corporate pensions in the 1980s and a decrease in the 
pension beneficiaries. In short, I analyze the impact of labor flexibilization 
on corporate welfare in Korea amid a shift towards post Fordism using an 
Esping-Andersen framework.
one study by Kim, J. (1999) on corporate welfare changes after the 
foreign exchange crisis is restricted to just 1998; this makes it difficult to 
gauge changes caused by labor flexibilization over the long term. In contrast, 
Kim, J., Park, c. and oh, H. (2004) charted the effects of the crisis from its 
beginning through 2001. Their study (2004), however, does not systematically 
observe the changes in terms of labor flexibilization. our study differs in that 
I examine the changes wrought by labor flexibilization from the beginning of 
the foreign exchange crisis to 2003.
Section 2 withwill establish the theoretical background of how labor 
flexibilization following changes in the production paradigm of post-Fordism 
changed corporate welfare. Sections 3 and 4 will analyze how corporate 
welfare changed before and after the foreign exchange crisis in Korea. I will 
also argue that such changes were caused by the labor flexibilization strategy 
in the wake of the crisis. Section 5 will present the conclusion. Here I will 
propose that Korea’s shrinking corporate welfare can be understood as a sign 
of international convergence. That convergence isevidenced by Scandinavian’s 
shrinking state welfare, increasing corporate welfare as well as the united 
States’ expanding state welfare and shrinking corporate welfare systems..
II.  tHEorEtIcAL BAcKGround:  
LABor FLEXIBILIZAtIon StrAtEGY And cHAnGES 
In corPorAtE WELFArE 
In this section, I will look into the decrease in corporate welfare as the result 
of the labor flexibilization strategy. this strategy followed a shift in the 
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production paradigm and the development of a flexible welfare benefit system 
which coincided with an expansion of performance,based corporate welfare 
compensation.
1) The Concept of Flexible Use of Labor 
Post-Fordism is a new paradigm that helps corporations improve their 
competitiveness. This is done through a flexible production system, defined 
as flexible specialization combined with lean production (Park, S. 1994: 
275; cho, M. 1995). the change in the production paradigm resulted from 
higher flexibility in the production system. These changes were made  to cope 
with microelectronic automation, in which small quantity batch production 
replaced mass production, as well as the dramatic changes which occurred in 
demand (Park, S. 1994: 275; Koo, J. 1998: 640).
Post-Fordism is separated into three types of flexibility: flexibility in 
labor use, flexibility in production technology, and flexibility in industrial 
organization and capital structure (Park, S. 1994; cho, M. 1995). Flexibility 
in labor use forms consists of functional flexibility, numerical flexibility, and 
financial flexibility (Park, S. 1994: 275). Functional flexibility refers to the 
placement and functions of labor within the workplace that improve the 
level of employees’ skillfulness. numerical flexibility is an adjustment of the 
amount of employment and working hours. This tactic regulates the demand 
for labor over a short period of time (cho, d. 2001). Financial flexibility 
refers to differentiating worker’s wages depending upon their ability and 
performance. Wage differentiation is in turn subject to the corporation’s 
financial capability and the supply and demand in the labor market. In short, 
labor flexibility is a multidimensional concept involving qualitative and 
quantitative aspect of human resources combined with wages (Eo, S. 1994). 
2)  Relationship between Labor Flexibilization Strategy and Corporate 
Welfare 
Financial flexibilization as one form of labor flexibilization strategies involves 
both regulating the absolute level of waves via wage freezing or reduction 
in the short term along with linking wages to ability or performance, 
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diversifying the wage system and flexibilizing welfare benefits as a long 
term indirect strategy (ryu, G. 1998). We will now examine the concepts of 
reducing welfare costs, expanding variable wages and flexibilizing welfare 
benefit systems as a means of labor flexibilization.
(1)  Reducing Non-Wage Costs (Welfare Benefit Costs) as a Means of Labor 
Flexibilization 
Flexibilizing labor through financial flexibilization is achieved through 
curtailing labor cost increases (Park, d. 2004: 124). Limiting the rise in labor 
costs can be achieved in two ways: through unit labor cost and non-wage 
labor cost. there are different strategies for limiting unit labor costs. these 
include increasing productivity, improving the wage system, and diversifying 
wage levels. controlling non-wage labor costs can be achieved primarily by 
reducing welfare benefit cost. In other words curtailing of non-wage labor 
costs also reduces welfare costs, which can in turn help change the corporate 
welfare system. 
As referred to above, Korea witnessed a decrease in the growth of 
corporate welfare costs following the foreign exchange crisis. that crisis 
resulted from corporations flexibilizing their labor flexibilization. Exactly how 
that corporate welfare changed and its relationship with labor flexibilization 
will be discussed in Sections 3 and 4 in greater detail.
(2)  Flexibilization of the Welfare Benefit System as a Part of Labor 
Flexibilization 
under the existing welfare benefit system, all employees receive additional 
welfare benefits per union rules, which raise overall benefit costs. The flexible 
welfare benefit system allocates a certain amount of welfare for each worker 
and lets him or her choose (Kim, J. 2004). In this way, workers needs are 
met while welfare benefit costs can be predicted to a certain degree. the 
corporation, meanwhile, is able to regulate the level of the total welfare costs 
as well as  labor costs (Argument in Writing 2011: 38). Welfare costs are 
included in the overall budget, which gives corporations ultimate control. 
This means corporations are able to reduce the total welfare benefit budget 
and instead allocate funds to individuals in order to curtail rising labor costs 
during recessions. thus corporations enters adopt and proliferate flexible 
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welfare systems as part of a financial flexibility strategy to control total labor 
costs. Korean corporations’ adoption of the flexible welfare benefit systems 
can thus be viewed as part of a financial flexibility strategy to be discussed 
further in Sections 3 and 4. 
the various forms of flexible welfare benefits are collectively called the 
cafeteria welfare system or a selective welfare benefit system. the flexible 
benefit plan allows individual employees to choose from multiple welfare 
menus (i.e. medical support, housing subsidies, scholarships for children, 
self-development, and pension subsidies) within a fixed budget just as 
one chooses what to eat in a cafeteria (Song, G. and Park, G. 1997). Some 
corporations offer flat sum selective welfare system, but most provide a flat 
rate system that takes into account years of service, position and recent 
performance. Such differences highlight the differences between corporate 
welfare systems and facilitates competition amongst workers (cho, G. 2001).
(3) Expansion of Performance-Sharing as a Means of Labor Flexibilization 
Another financial flexibilization strategy is linking the wage system to 
corporate performance (ryu, G. 1998). This particular strategy regulates total 
labor costs (Park, W. 1998), and is known as a performance sharing system. 
Sharing can be in the form of cash or stocks, distributed as either a bonus or 
in a welfare fund raised for later use (ryu, G. 1998). Performance sharing to 
flexibilize labor use can impact the creation and development of the corporate 
welfare fund system. 
In Korea, the employee welfare fund system was also a part of labor 
flexibilization strategy. I will discuss further how the labor flexibilization 
strategy affected the expansion of the employee welfare fund system.
While other corporate welfare costs are either quasi-fixed or fixed, 
depending upon employment rather than unit labor, employee welfare funds 
are deemed variable costs that depend on the amount of labor put in by the 
corporation (Shin, B. 2003). In other words, corporate welfare such as housing 
subsidies and scholarshipa are determined by whether a worker is employed 
or not whereas employee welfare funds are based on profits. Those depend on 
the number of hours worked and the intensity of labor input, which is why 
employee welfare funds are considered a type of compensation for labor (Shin, 
B. 2003). After the economic crisis, corporations decided to expand employee 
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welfare funds, which were linked to performance to flexibilize their labor 
relationship. This was more desirable than simply raising wages or bonuses 
since that would give them less options in certain situations. Specifically, 
raising wages or bonuses would limit their options in situations such as 
paying out severance packages, so instead many corporations opted to reserve 
part of unexpected revenues in the form of employee welfare benefits instead. 
developed nations such as the u.S. adopted a performance sharing scheme 
that links productivity to wages in response to the stagnant or decreasing 
labor productivity that began during the 1980’s (nam, S. 1993; Lee, S. 1994). 
Performance sharing systems smooth out the impact of unstable economic 
fluctuations because they can be adjusted depending on the size of both 
planned and achieved performance (Kang, d. 1993: 19). the relationship 
between labor flexibilization, financial flexibilization, decreasing corporate 
welfare costs, flexible welfare benefit systems, and performance sharing 
Three dimensions of labor 
flexibilization strategies 
Functional 
flexibility numerical flexibility compensational flexibility 
means
reducing 
non-wage costs
Expanding of per-
formance sharing
Flexibilizing
welfare benefit 
system
Figure 1. The relationship between the labor flexibilization strategy and corporate welfare
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employee welfare funds is illustrated below.
III.  HoW coProrAtE WELFArE cHAnGEd AFtEr tHE 
ForEIGn EXcHAnGE crISIS 
In the previous section, I examined reducing corporate welfare costs, 
the adoption of a flexible corporate welfare system, and the expansion of 
performance sharing corporate welfare as aspects of a labor flexibilization 
strategy. In this section I will discuss how corporate welfare costs changed. 
Specifically, I explore how a selective welfare benefit system as a type of 
flexible corporate welfare was adopted, as well as how the employee welfare 
fund system expanded. I will subsequently argue that all these changes 
emerged as part of labor flexibilization. 
I will use the “report on Labor costs of corporations” to analyze how 
corporate welfare changed. First, I will explain how the increase in corporate 
welfare costs while the ratio of corporate welfare to total labor costs began to 
decrease. Secondly, I will show how that selective welfare system began to be 
adopted and then expanded after the crisis. Thirdly, I will show that corporate 
welfare in Korea contains more variable costs (current) nature (performance 
sharing nature) by demonstrating that proportionally, employee welfare funds 
began to increase. 
1)  Slower Corporate Welfare Growth and Decreasing Ratio of Corporate 
Welfare Proportional to Total Labor Costs 
Figure 2 shows that corporate welfare in Korea continued to rise until 1992, 
stabilized between 1993 and 1995, slightly rose from 1995 to 1997 and 
decreased after 1997 when the foreign crisis erupted. 
table 1 confirms this trend. In the table, the ratio of corporate welfare to 
the total labor costs increased from 5.8 percent in 1987 through 6.0 percent 
in 1990, 8.5 percent in 1992 to 9.3 percent in 1993. Then it started to decrease 
in 1994 until it reached as low as 6.1 percent in 1998. Afterwards, it stabilized 
until 2001 before it rose to 7 percent in 2002, which was still lower than the 8 
percent in the early 1990s (see Figure 3).
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Figure 2. changes in corporate welfare expenditure 
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Table 1. ratio total labor costs vs. total cash wages by year 
unit: KW 1,000 (%)
total labor costs total cash wages Legal welfare expense
corporate welfare 
expense
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
    468.6 (100)
    546.3 (100)
    659.7 (100)
    816.3 (100)
1,011.5 (100)
1,179.5 (100)
1,336.8 (100)
1,501.9 (100)
1,726.7 (100)
1,870.5 (100)
2,082.1 (100)
2,324.7 (100)
2,370.8 (100)
2,777.3 (100)
2,661.1 (100)
2,827.6 (100)
    3,206 (100)
    393.2
    458.1
    554.7
    667.3
    781.1
    891.0
    989.3
1,132.3
1294.9
1456.0
1542.9
1409.4
1550.0
1740.7
1840.4
2053.5
2293.3
   10.8 (2.3)
   18.8 (3.4)
   19.7 (3.0)
   24.0 (2.9)
   37.9 (3.7)
   50.9 (4.3)
   61.9 (4.6)
   55.1 (3.7)
   64.8 (3.7)
   81.0 (4.3)
   98.1 (4.7)
121.3 (5.2)
163.0 (6.9)
182.2 (6.6)
209.2 (7.9)
220.5 (7.8)
242.8 (7.6)
   27.1 (5.8)
   26.3 (4.8)
   35.7 (5.4)
   49.1 (6.0)
   75.3 (7.4)
   99.7 (8.5)
124.5 (9.3)
126.4 (8.4)
120.8 (7.0)
139.5 (7.5)
154.0 (7.4)
140.8 (6.1)
173.5 (7.3)
168.7 (6.1)
173.7 (6.5)
197.3 (7.0)
227.3 (7.1)
data: Ministry of Employment and Labor, Survey report on labor cost of enterprise, 1987-
2003. 
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2) Expansion of the Selective Welfare-Benefit System 
Another change in corporate welfare in Korea was the adoption of a selective 
welfare benefit system. The flexible benefit plan flexibilizes non-wage benefits 
and reportedly was first introduced in Korea by IBM Korea in January 1997, 
followed by cheil Jedang in July in the same year. this received significant 
attention from Korean corporations following the foreign exchange crisis 
(Wage Study 1997). 
A recent survey reveals that 44 out of 424 respondents, or 15 percent, are 
preparing to adopt a selective welfare benefit system, 86 percent of which will 
adopt it within three years. This suggests that the adoption of this system will 
accelerate in years to come (Samsung Life Insurance & Watson Wyatt 2000). 
A series of research reports has come out from private and government 
research institutes which deal with flexible benefit plans (Song, G. 1997; 
Yu, G. and  cho, G. 1999; Korea Labor Institute 2002). the Wage Study, a 
publication issued by the Korea Employers Federation, carried a feature 
article about the selective welfare system, reflecting the increasing interest in 
the system amongst corporations (Park, W. 2001).
Figure 3. changes in the ratio of corporate welfare to the total labor cost
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3) Increasing Employee- Elfare Fund of Performance Sharing Nature 
As shown in table 2, employee welfare funds comprised less than 10 percent 
of total costs between 1994 and 1998; they then rose sharply, from between 
10.4 to 16.8 percent between 1999 and 2003. one of the reasons why 
employee welfare funds started to increase in comparison to other welfare 
costs is that other welfare costs are hard to reduce once they increase. on the 
other hand, employee welfare funds can be readily increased or decreased 
each year depending on the performance of the corporation. In other words, 
employee welfare fund are more suited to meeting a corporation’s goal of 
flexible, elastic labor management.
As shown in Figure 4, corporate welfare costs excluding employee welfare 
funds remained stable between 1997 and 2000. However, when employee 
welfare funds are included, they increased abruptly from 1998. This suggests 
that employee welfare funds are one of the most significant driving forces 
behind increasing corporate welfare costs. Indeed, as shown in Figure 4, 
employee welfare funds rose sharply after 1998. Figure 4 also shows that 
corporate welfare costs rose sharply between 2002 and 2003, during which 
time employee welfare funds increased accordingly. Based on the evidence 
Table 2. The proportion of employee welfare fund from 1994 to 2003 
unit: KW 1,000 (%)
total corporate welfare 
costs (A)
Employee welfare fund 
(B)
other corporate welfare 
costs (A-B)
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
126.4 (100)
120.8 (100)
139.5 (100)
154.0 (100)
140.8 (100)
173.5 (100)
168.7 (100)
173.7 (100)
197.3 (100)
227.3 (100)
13.8 (10.9)
9.8 (8.1)
9.5 (6.8)
10.4 (6.7)
8.7 (6.1)
27.5 (15.8)
28.3 (16.8)
19.7 (11.3)
20.6 (10.4)
34.2 (15.0)
112.6 (89.1)
111.0 (91.9)
130.0 (93.2)
143.6 (93.3)
132.1 (93.7)
146.0 (84.2)
140.4 (83.2)
154.0 (88.7)
176.7 (89.6)
193.1 (85.0)
data:  Ministry of Employment and Labor, Report on Enterprise Labor Cost Survey, 1994-
2003.
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shown above, one of the most significant causes of increasing corporate 
welfare costs after 1997 areis employee welfare funds. this suggests that 
corporate welfare costs are becoming more and more timely.
table 3 shows the proportions of items comprising corporate welfare 
costs. over the period from 1994 and 1998, employee welfare costs ranked 
between 3rd to 6th in terms of how much they comprised corporate welfare 
costs. After 1999, however, it rose to 2nd to 4th after meal costs, and in some 
Figure 4. changes in employee welfare fund
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Table 3. The ranks of items comprising corporate welfare costs
Housing costs Meal costs Educational aid costs
Employee 
welfare fund others
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2
4
4
4 
4
5
5
5
5
6
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
4
2
2
2
3
4
4
3
3
4
3
5
6
5
5
2
2
4
4
3
6
3
3
3
2
3
3
2
2
2
data(reconfiguration):  Ministry of Employment and Labor, Report on Enterprise Labor 
Cost Survey, 1994-2003.
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years, it even ranked first. the proportionally faster increase of employee 
welfare funds compared to corporate welfare costs, which are more akin to 
fixed costs, suggests that the nature of corporate welfare in Korea changed 
and continues to change.
IV.  LABor FLEXIBILIZAtIon And cHAnGE In 
corPorAtE WELFArE In KorEA 
In Section 3, I analyzed how corporate welfare changed in Korea in the wake 
of the foreign exchange crisis. In this section, I will show that the change in 
corporate welfare in the wake of the crisis was ignited by labor flexibilization. 
1) Adoption and Expansion of Labor Flexibilization in Korea 
Faced with a rapidly changing market environment and in response to a 
trend of small quantity batch production, a movement called management 
rationalization erupted, especially among large corporations beginning 
in1987. the core of the movement was to set up a new labor management 
strategy to make the best of human resources within an organization 
(Park, S. 1994). new Hr and labor management systems adopted by major 
conglomerates from 1987 were different from their predecessors in that 
they were based on different strategic considerations. In terms of labor force 
management, the new labor management practices featured: 1) pursuit of 
more functional flexibility through consolidation and multi-functionalization, 
2) improvement of the promotion system and Hr management based on 
a merit system, 3) incentive-based personnel evaluation and emphasis 
on normative and integrative factors and 4) pursuit of more quantitative 
flexibility through vertical subcontracting and more use of dispatched 
workers (Park, S. 1994: 299).
As shown above, employment flexibilization started to be adopted in a 
piecemeal manner by some private large corporations and public corporations 
late in the 1980s and on a larger scale by PoSco, Korea Electronics and a few 
other large corporations. Labor flexibilization started to be adopted widely 
across the industry in the mid-1990s as one of the core strategies to raise 
48 Korean Social Sciences review | Vol. 2, no. 2, 2012
corporate competitiveness (Park, H. 1997). 
2)  Changes in Corporate Welfare as a Result of Labor Flexibilization in 
Korea 
In this section, I will discuss how corporate welfare changed after the 1990s 
when labor flexibilization unfolded on a wider scale in Korea. 
(1)  Welfare Adjustment and Corporate Welfare Shrinkage as a Result of 
Financial Flexibility Strategy 
As mentioned in Section 2, financial flexibility strategy involves the curtailed 
growth of non-wage labor costs, which in turn entails a reduction in welfare 
benefit costs. In Korea, there was a move to curtail the growth in non-wage 
labor costs presumably lead to a slower increase in corporate welfare cost 
and a reduction in the ratio of corporate welfare costs to total labor costs. I 
will now look at how curtailed growth of labor costs affected the change in 
corporate welfare in a greater detail.
table 4 reveals that labor flexibilization from december 1997 to March 
1998 occurred at a faster rate than from January to november 1997 as a result 
of the IMF bailout and the subsequent recession. during the former period, 
181 out of 300 corporations, or 60.3 percent, had employment restructuring, 
28 percent higher than that during the Jan to nov 1997 period. As shown in 
table 4, the two most widely used methods of labor flexibilization in response 
to worsening corporate performance is changing the number of employees 
and wage control. 
the percentage of companies which implemented labor flexibilization 
was less than 20 percent before the IMF crisis, but it jumped to 38.7 percent 
afterwards. It skyrocketed to as high as 78.9 percent during the period 
between April to october 1998. to look more in detail into how they 
implemented wage cuts during the period between Apr to oct 1998, 61.1 
percent of them froze wages, 57.7 percent cut wages including bonuses, 
and 47.3 percent shrank non-wage labor costs including welfare benefits 
and training subsidies (See table 4). In addition, Kim, Y. (1999) finds that 
from the end of 1997 to november 1998, 8.4 percent of the total corporate 
respondents used reducing welfare benefits as a key means of controlling 
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Table 4. the change in corporate welfare in the wake of the foreign exchange crisis 
(Multiple responses) 
unit: piece (%)
Employment adjustment
1994-96 1997. 1-11.
1997. 12-
1998. 3
1998. 
4-10.
Employment hours adjustment 
reducing overtime hours
reducing regular working hours
Increasing holidays 
recommending use holidays 
temporary closing
temporary leave of absence
244 (40.7)
89 (14.8)
 
 
 
10 (1.7)
 
60 (20)
18 (6.0)
4 (1.3)
27 (9.0)
41 (13.7)
4 (1.3)
 
110 (36.7)
52 (17.3)
13 (4.3)
29 (9.7)
94 (31.3)
8 (2.7)
3 (1.0)
199 (56.1)
82 (23.1)
22 (6.2)
58 (16.3)
169 (47.6)
26 (7.3)
16 (4.5)
changing the number of employees 
replacing irregular workers
Hiring freeze or cut 
conducting early retirement 
reducing temporary workers
Layoffs 
 
 
146 (24.3)
69 (11.5)
39 (6.5)
26 (4.3)
59 (19.7)
7 (2.3)
45 (15.0)
17 (5.7)
11 (3.7)
21 (7.0)
131 (43.7)
15 (5.0)
116 (38.7)
24 (8.0)
38 (12.7)
52 (17.3)
247 (69.6)
56 (15.8)
199 (56.1)
83 (23.4)
62 (17.5)
87 (24.5)
Functional adjustment 
Internal & external education/training
transposition 
dispatch
transferring to affiliates 
152 (25.3)
 
96 (16)
 
73 (12.2)
38 (12.7)
5 (1.7)
31 (10.3)
1 (0.3)
7 (2.3)
73 (24.3)
12 (4.0)
60 (20.0)
2 (0.7)
13 (4.3)
106 (29.9)
32 (9.0)
83 (23.4)
11 (3.1)
31 (8.7)
company reconstructing
Expanding subcontracts 
closing business or moving overseas
M&A
reducing divisions
Small business owner system
167 (27.8)
62 (10.3)
26 (4.3)
 
 
120 (20.0)
18 (6.0)
6 (2.0)
3 (1.0)
1 (0.3)
9 (3.0)
3 (1.0)
34 (11.3)
9 (3.0)
6 (2.0)
-
21 (7.0)
4 (1.3)
109 (30.7)
41 (11.5)
32 (9.0)
19 (5.4)
57 (16.1)
23 (6.5)
Wage adjustment
Wage freezing 
Bonus & wage cut 
reforming wage system
other wage cut1)
117 (19.5)
 
 
 
 
32 (10.7)
20 (6.7)
18 (6.0)
1 (0.3)
 
116 (38.7)
75 (25.0)
86 (28.7)
10 (3.3)
 
280 (78.9)
217 (61.1)
205 (57.7)
42 (11.8)
168 (47.3)
number of companies conducting 
employment adjustment 312 (52) 97 (32.3) 181 (60.3) 168 (47.3)
total number of companies surveyed 600 300 300 304 (85.6)
notes: 1) This data was added to the october 1998 survey
            (  ) ratio of the total number of companies surveyed 
data: reconstructed from tables of choi, K. and Lee, G. (1998), choi, K. (1999).
50 Korean Social Sciences review | Vol. 2, no. 2, 2012
wages. 
What has been found so far can be summarized as follows. First, many 
corporations implemented employment adjustment using flexibilization in 
the wake of the foreign exchange crisis. Secondly, wage adjustment was used 
as a key means of labor flexibilization, which includes cutting welfare benefits. 
third, the majority of respondents used non-wage cost reduction such as 
cutting welfare benefits to control their wage level. Based on such findings, 
it can be concluded that changes in the corporate welfare system including 
the curtailed growth of corporate welfare costs and the decreasing ratio of 
corporate welfare to the total wage costs resulted from wage control as part of 
labor flexibilization.
The reason for shrinking corporate welfare—which is a type of wage—is 
that unions focused more on job stability rather than wage increases. unions’ 
top priority was job security and thus had no interest in other working 
conditions. consequently, the proportion of negotiations that included 
unions’ right to participate in changing or revising the wage system was 37.5 
percent in 1996, but it went down to 15.6 percent right after the crisis (Moon, 
M. 2001: 243). Labor disputes were largely attributed to collective bargaining 
over unions’ participation in management and job security rather than to 
wage increases (Lee, J. 2001). All these conditions suggest that shrinking 
corporate welfare took place a lot more readily after the crisis compared to 
before it. 
(2)  Layoffs As A Result Of Quantitative Flexibilization Strategy And 
Shrinking Corporate Welfare As A Result Of Efforts To Avoid Layoffs 
As discussed in Section 2, quantitative flexibilization as labor flexibilization 
involves controlling the amount of employment (number of employees and 
working time) to regulate demand for labor within a given time period. 
Layoffs were also used to regulate labor. corporations, however, had to use 
wage control tactics including reducing their corporate welfare before laying 
off their employees. This certainly led to a reduction in corporate welfare. 
From this point on, I will discuss how labor flexibilization after the crisis 
affected shrinkage in corporate welfare.
the IMF demanded, among other things, that the Korean capital and 
financial market be fully open and the labor market be more flexible. the 
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launch of the Labor, Employer and Government committee (Jan 15, 1998) 
and the ‘Social Pact of Feb 2’ paved a way for regulatory framework for 
making the labor market more flexible to be officially adopted (Lee, J. 2002). 
on March 13, 1997, labor laws were revised to make layoffs easier. this 
provided a legal framework for corporations to adopt flexible work hours, 
and different working systems including selective ones would make working 
hours more flexible (Eo, S. 1994). on Feb 22, 1998 the clause stipulating a 2 
year grace period for the adoption of layoffs was deleted to make the system 
immediately take effect. The Labor Standards Act, revised in 1997, however, 
stipulates that employers should make efforts first to avoid any layoffs (Yang, J. 
2003). consequently, corporations had to make efforts until the last moment 
before they went for quantitative flexibilization such as layoffs.
As shown in table 5, one of the most notable changes in avoiding layoffs is 
that more and more corporations who chose wage cuts that included bonuses 
increased significantly. The proportion of corporations using wage (including 
bonus) cuts during the 1994-1996 period was 19.2 percent and 38.1 percent 
during the Jan to nov 1997 period, respectively. It jumped to 63.5 percent 
during the dec 1997 to Mar 1998 period and 77 percent during the Apr to 
Table 5. Efforts to avoid layoff before layoffs were conducted (Multiple responses) 
unit: piece (%)
1994-1996 1997. 1-11 1997. 12-1998. 3 1998. 4-10
recruitment control
Bonus & wage cut 
transposition 
recruiting retirees
reducing working hours
reducing temporary workers
dispatch
no efforts
others
12 (61.5)
5 (19.2)
16 (61.5)
9 (34.6)
6 (23.1)
6 (23.1)
10 (38.5)
3 (11.5)
2 (7.7)
17 (81.0)
9 (38.1)
5 (23.8)
4 (19.0)
1 (4.8)
6 (28.6)
2 (9.5)
1 (4.8)
-
44 (84.6)
33 (63.5)
19 (36.5)
14 (26.9)
17 (32.7)
19 (36.5)
6 (11.5)
2 (3.8)
1 (1.9)
68 (78.2)
67 (77.0)
33 (37.9)
32 (36.8)
23 (26.4)
22 (25.3)
13 (14.9)
-
-
total 26 21 52 87
(  ) ratio of the companies that conducted effort to avoid layoffs
data:  choi, K. (1999). Status of corporate employment adjustment in Korea; Focusing on 
the second half of the 1998 survey.
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oct 1998 period. consequently, the proportion of wage cuts reached the same 
level as suspending new recruitment, one of the most widely used means for 
corporations to use to avoid layoffs. Though not shown in table 5 specifically, 
it can be presumed that a reduction in corporate welfare was included in the 
‘wage cut’ item. Yang, J. (2003) and Kim, Y. (1999: 106) find that the most 
widely used methods to avoid layoffs included curtailing wage increases 
by reducing bonuses, diversifying the wage system included increasing 
performance-based pay and reducing non-wage labor costs. Here, reducing 
non-wage labor costs meant shrinking corporate welfare. 
(3)  Increased Provision for Employee Welfare Fund as Part of the Financial 
Flexibilization Strategy
In Section 2, I mentioned another method of labor flexibilization, which 
is changing wage structure towards compensation linked to performance; 
this can increase the provision for employee welfare funds which are a type 
of compensation for labor. Korea experienced a shift towards performance 
compensating wage structures as part of labor flexibilizations, which led to 
an increase in employee welfare funds. From this point on, I will examine 
how the performance sharing system, a type of labor flexibilization, affected 
corporate welfare in terms of enlarged employee funds.
one of the significant changes seen in Korea’s labor market during a 
recession after 1987 were efforts to raise productivity by improving wage 
structures (Lee, S. 1994). Awareness of performance sharing proliferated 
rapidly after the 6.29 declaration in 1987, and many corporations started 
considering linking their employees’ wage to performance; many eventually 
did adopt ttemhis system, contributing considerably to an increase in 
productivity (nam, S. 1993; Lee, S. 1994).
the government excluded performance sharing bonuses from total 
wage calculations. this was meant to encourage corporations to adopt 
performance sharing schemes in order to curtail the sharp wage increases 
which erupted after the 6.29 declaration in 1987 (nam, S. 1993: Monthly 
Management World 2000). Behind the government’s drive for a performance 
sharing system was its intention to stabilize wage increases sweeping through 
the entire country at that time. Employee welfare funds, another type of 
performance sharing, were adopted under the government’s drive in 1992. 
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corporations, however, adopted the performance sharing schemes 
voluntarily to improve their employees’ productivity by giving work 
incentives in the run-up to overcoming the crisis (Management World, May). 
With the possibility of low growth imminent after the foreign exchange crisis, 
performance-linked systems emerged as key criteria for Hr management, 
and more and more corporations chose to adopt annual salary systems and 
performance sharing systems (Kim, J., Park, I., and Gwang, Y. 2001). 
In 1996 when the Ministry of Labor first conducted a survey, only 1.6 
percent of the respondents had adopted an annual salary system and only 
5.7 percent of them had performance-sharing in place. A survey of 5,116 
companies with employees of 100 or more conducted in 2000 showed that 
much greater proportion of the respondents had adopted performance 
sharing (Wage Study 2000). In 2001, the proportion of those with 
performance sharing in place was 21.8 percent (Lee, S. 2002). Another study 
shows that the proportion of corporations with performance sharing in 2005 
was 32.1 percent (Kim, d. and Jeong, J. 2005). 
According to a survey by the Ministry of Labor, 92.6 percent of 
corporations with performance sharing responded that they make payments 
in the form of bonuses, suggesting that most corporations pay cash in 
distributing their profit. Still, 3.5 percent of the respondents answered 
that they make provisions for employee welfare funds. Assuming that the 
proportion of corporations with employee welfare funds, amongst those who 
had performance sharing up and running between 1996 and 2005 remained 
the same, the proportion of corporations who adopted performance sharing 
during the same period increased from 5.7 percent to 32.1 percent. this 
suggests that the number of corporations who chose employee welfare funds 
for performance sharing increased significantly.
Assuming that the proportion of corporations with employee welfare 
funds amongst those who had performance sharing remained the same as 3.5 
percent between 1996 and 2005, the proportion of corporations that adopted 
performance sharing during the same period increased from 5.7 percent to 
32.1 percent. this suggests that the number of corporations that instated 
performance sharing through employee welfare fund increased significantly.
What can be inferred from this finding is that employ welfare funds 
proliferated as performance sharing became widespread in the wake of 
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the foreign exchange crisis. As mentioned in Section 4, the driving force 
behind the sharp increase in the adoption of employee welfare fund is the 
proliferation of performance sharing as part of a labor flexibilization strategy.
4) Adoption and Proliferation of Selective Welfare Benefit System 
As mentioned in Section 2, corporations adopt and expand flexible 
welfare benefit systems that allow easy control of total labor cost and cost 
effectiveness as part of their labor flexibilization strategy. Korea saw a shift 
towards flexible benefit plans part of labor flexibilization after the foreign 
exchange crisis, which in turn led to an increase in the flexible welfare benefit 
system. From this point on, I will look into why corporations choose to adopt 
flexible benefit plans and what impact the labor flexibilization movement has 
had on the adoption of selective welfare benefit systems.
the entry of a low growth regime and the shift towards management 
emphasis after the foreign exchange crisis made corporations feel the need 
for an improvement in their welfare benefit systems (Park, W. 2001: 5). 
Amid a changing business environment, there were many corporations 
who considered improving their welfare benefit system to raise their cost 
effectiveness, and many set their eyes on the flexible benefit plans (Park, 
W. 2001: 6; Yu, G. and cho, G. 1999: 2). In addition, there arose a need for 
cost split linked to performance because welfare benefit costs are deemed a 
part of total labor costs, and there has been a consensus that those who have 
performed better deserve greater welfare benefits. Many Korean corporations 
chose to adopt flexible benefit plan over their existing ones (Kim, H. 2001). 
IBM, the first corporation in Korea to adopt a flexible benefit plan in 1999, 
wanted to meet the diversifying needs of their employees on a limited budget 
(Ministry of Labor 2002). LG distribution designed its welfare benefit system 
modeling upon IBM and cheiljedang’s and started preparation for full-
fledged adoption in September 1998 (Park, W. 2001: 16-17). In compliance 
with the policy of the LG Group, its parent company, LG distribution 
decided to shrink its spending on welfare benefits for their employees, which 
cause a significant drop in their satisfaction level. Given that, the corporation 
considered the adoption of a selective welfare system to make spending 
on welfare benefits predictable while meeting employees’ needs for welfare 
 Labor Flexibilization after the Foreign Exchange crisis 55
benefits (Park, W. and Lee, c. 1999). dongyang confectioneries adopted the 
flexible benefit planin 2000. Behind the adoption was the recognition that it is 
almost impossible to increase welfare benefits for all of its employees equally 
at the same rate and a need to use limited resources to meet the needs of all 
the employees (Lee, J. 2011: 97).
As part of this shift, personnel management focusing on seniority and 
lifelong employment diminished and merit and new, performance-based 
personnel management was adopted. In addition, the welfare benefit system 
changed to a selective welfare system, where benefits were differentiated 
across positions and years of service (Park, W. 2001: 21-22). IBM Korea 
and Haan Soft run a flat sum system while most of the others run a flat rate 
system (Written Argument 2001: 35). As shown in the motivation of several 
corporations to adopt the selective welfare system, the reason why flexible 
benefit plans proliferated is that they allow for cost control and are cost 
effective. consequently, the flexible benefit plans were adopted to flexibilize 
corporations’ labor use.
V. concLuSIon
In this paper, I argue that labor flexibilization in the wake of foreign exchange 
crisis has shrunk corporate welfare and increased the proportion of employee 
welfare funds, which are similar to performance sharing. I also showed that 
flexible welfare benefit system which allows for easier cost control and higher 
cost effectiveness as part of labor flexibilization.
I used corporate welfare cost per regular worker, while analysis of the 
total corporate welfare cost was calculated by multiplying corporate welfare 
cost per worker with the total number of workers revealing more reduced 
corporate welfare after the IMF crisis. that is because the proportion of 
irregular workers excluded from receiving corporate welfare increased 
significantly. The prediction made in the early- and mid-1990’s that corporate 
welfare in Korea would continue to rise proved wrong, as was the notion 
that Korea needed to establish a social welfare model centering on corporate 
welfare.
It is not plausible that corporate welfare in Korea will continue to rise. 
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That is because corporations, who could reduce their corporate welfare with 
the consent of labor unions in the wake of the IMF crisis, know very well that 
corporate welfare has a nature of fixed cost, which, once adopted, is difficult 
if not impossible to abandon (Park, H. 2002). In addition, corporations are 
moving fast to control their total labor costs which include not only cash 
wages but also corporate welfare costs in an era where cost reduction is the 
key to improving the competitiveness of both the national economy and their 
own (Kim, J. et al. 2004: 35). corporations will try to cut down on corporate 
welfare which is paid regardless of performance and increase the proportion 
of wages in an era where performance and evaluation are linked very closely 
(cho, G. 2001: Park, W. 2001: 5). There is a movement in government as well, 
which is set to newly impose tax on some type of corporate welfare such as 
housing loans or reducing the limit of tax benefits (Kim. J. et al. 2004: 38). 
The government, in particular, maintains a negative stance about corporate 
welfare by curtailing corporate welfare costs and taking them into account for 
evaluation for state-run or state-participated corporations.
In addition, corporations bearing statutory welfare costs, which are 
relatively high, make it difficult to develop a corporate welfare system, 
which is their voluntary employee welfare program. As shown in table 1, 
the proportion of statutory welfare costs to the total costs increased from 2.3 
percent in 1987, 4.3 percent in 1992, 5.2 percent in 1998 and 7.6 percent in 
2003. rising statutory welfare costs often result in corporations aiming to 
control total labor costs to reduce corporate welfare, which can be deemed as 
their pure welfare benefit systems.
Shrinking corporate welfare and rising statutory welfare in Korea where 
corporate welfare is well developed can be understood within an international 
context. In the u.S. where corporate welfare is much more advanced, large 
corporations tend to prefer a national medical insurance system while they 
are active in dismantling corporate welfare (Esping-Andersen 1996). In 
contrast, the uK and Scandinavia, where state welfare is well developed, 
have seen movements to hand over their welfare responsibilities to the 
market, which in turn gave birth to corporate pension markets (Mares 2003; 
Pearson and Martin 2005). In other words, states where corporate welfare is 
developed witness an increase in state welfare while those where state welfare 
is developed see a growth in corporate welfare. This suggests that an era of 
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international convergence might be under way (Esping-Andersen 1996). 
It seems however that corporate welfare in Korea will be reduced to 
those in other countries where state welfare is developed. This is because, as 
pointed out in the analysis of corporate welfare in western countries, welfare 
activity of corporations depends not only on change in state welfare but 
also on taxation policy or legal frameworks applicable to corporate welfare 
(Adema and Einerhand 1998; Pearson and Martin 2005). Given that, Korea 
sees little room for a reduction in corporate welfare because most of the 
corporate welfare programs in Korea are directed by legal requirements 
and administrative instructions (Song, J. 1997). Evaluation of labor market 
flexibility based on non-wage factors in labor costs reveals that Japan is the 
most flexible with a rate of 18.3 percent followed by the u.S. (27.4), Korea 
(30.8%) and Germany (44.9) (Park, d. 2004). this suggests that Korea’s 
degree of flexibility through wage regulations is still low and has its gap with 
advanced countries’ unfilled.
Korea has used means developmental state means in which the welfare of 
workers is left to the hands of the market to detach the working class from 
politics. A shift towards post Fordism and labor market flexibilization now 
changes the landscape of Korea’s social welfare where corporate welfare plays 
an important role. This paper tried to reveal the instability of Korea’s social 
welfare model based on corporate welfare. It also tried to contribute to the 
development of theories about the developmental path of diverse corporate 
welfare models after the IMF crisis by looking into Korea’s unique experience 
in shrinking corporate welfare, which is different from its counterpart in the 
Western world.
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